A queridinha das televisões
Tenho este email pendurado numa página aberta no browser do servidor há vários dias. Como tenho que o reiniciar e isto convém relembrar de vez em quando, vou guardar por aqui.
É um email da parva da clinton (não, a queridinha não é a cristina 🙂 que explica a razão de haver 500000 sírios mortos e 6 milhões a fugir disto
O email está aqui e percebe-se um pouco a irritação com o wikileaks. Assim não se pode ter ‘opiniões privadas”.
Excertos:
The best way to help Israel deal with Iran’s growing nuclear capability is to help the people of Syria overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad. Negotiations to limit Iran’s nuclear program will not solve Israel’s security dilemma.
It is the strategic relationship between Iran and the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria that makes it possible for Iran to undermine Israel’s security. The end of the Assad regime would end this dangerous alliance. Israel’s leadership understands well why defeating Assad is now in its interests.
Bringing down Assad would not only be a massive boon to Israel’s security, it would also ease Israel’s understandable fear of losing its nuclear monopoly.
With Assad gone, and Iran no longer able to threaten Israel through its, proxies, it is possible that the United States and Israel can agree on red lines for when Iran’s program has crossed an unacceptable threshold.
With his life and his family at risk, only the threat or use of force will change the Syrian dictator Bashar Assad’s mind.
Libya was an easier case.
Some argue that U.S. involvement risks a wider war with Russia. But the Kosovo example shows otherwise.
As long as Washington’s political leaders stay firm that no U.S. ground troops will be deployed, as they did in both Kosovo and Libya, the costs to the United States will be limited. Victory may not come quickly or easily, but it will come. And the payoff will be substantial. Iran would be strategically isolated, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East.
The resulting regime in Syria will see the United States as a friend.